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Shaping Responsible Behavior:
Lessons from the AIDS Front
Harlon L. Dalton*
L Setting the Stage
Imagine that you are from the planet Saturn1 and are visiting the United
States on vacation. You are eager to figure out what makes these earthlings
(or at least the subset homo sapiens americanus) tick. 'What matters to them?
What thrills them? What troubles them? What moves them to action? What
renders them inert? How do they deal with the stresses and strains of daily
life? How do they sift through the barrage of information that confronts them
every day? How do they handle uncertainty? How do they deal with ambigu-
ity? How do they address their conflicting needs and desires?
Because your time is limited, you decide that the quickest way to enter
the species's psyche is to study its legal system. After all, it is well-known
throughout the solar system that these creatures use the law as a principal
means of articulating their values, resolving their conflicts, and controlling
their behavior. Surely law must be a repository of wisdom about human
nature!
What would you learn? 'What picture would emerge from such an exam-
ination? You most likely would conclude either that American homo sapiens
are about as psychologically complex as garden slugs or that they are blessed
with precious little self-understanding. In truth, our legal system does a poor
job of reflecting our interior selves. It portrays us as psychological stick
figures, lacking in color, texture, and dimension. And to the extent that the
law does reflect a view about human nature,2 that view is curious at best. It
is curious because most legislative and judicial utterances imagine us to be
* Professor, Yale Law School. Member, National Commission on AIDS, 1989-1993.
Assistant Director for Law, Policy & Ethics, Center for Interdisciplinary Research on AIDS at
Yale. The author based this article on a speech that he gave at the Washington and Lee School
of Law on March 2,1999, in connection with the Law and Responsibility Lecture Series.
1. I figure that it is about time to break the Martian monopoly on thought experiments.
2. I use the term "human nature" advisedly, fully recognizing that most of what we take
to be "the way we are" is historically, socially, and culturally contingent. Here, I use the term
to refer to deeply ingrained patterns, whether or not they are an essential part of being human.
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stable, well-knit, fully self-aware creatures even though everyday experience
reveals us to be mutable, loosely integrated, and internally opaque.' Similarly,
the law suggests that we are, or at least ought to be, wholly rational beings
even though we regularly acknowledge and even celebrate our nonrational
side.4
When it comes to understanding the human subject, our legal system
operates at a level of learning that we would never tolerate in politics or
marketing. To call it unsophisticated is to be charitable. Moreover, we seem
largely indifferent to the wealth of knowledge that the cognitive and behav-
ioral sciences have accumulated steadily.5 One well might ask why. Inertia
3. See generally, e.g., TBE MULTIPLE SELF (Jon Elster ed., 1985) (exploring various
theories of split self); WALTER TRUETTAMDERSON, THE FUTURE OF THE SELF: NvENTNG THE
POSTMODERN PERSON (1997) (discussing complexity of conception of self in society's idea of
self).
4. Evidence everywhere demonstrates our affective, emotive, esthetic, spiritual, and other-
wise nonrational selves: in museums and art galleries, on playing fields and in sports arenas, in
city parks and national forests, at singles' bars and along lovers' lanes. And then there is religion.
On Sunday mornings, I join with tens of millions of other religious believers in celebrating the
fact that we humans are more than self-interested, rational profit maximizers.
5. Like Rebecca Dresser, I use the term "cognitive science" to encompass both brain-
centered neurosciences and mentation-centered psychology. See generally Rebecca Dresser,
Review Essay, Can LawSurvive CognitiveScience?, 10 CRIM. JUST. ETI-cs 27 (1991) (compar-
ing possible future scenarios for role of mental state determinations in legal system). For a
sophisticated introduction to the field of cognitive psychology, see SUSAN T. FisKE & SHE.LEY
E. TAYLOR, SOciAL COGNTON (2d ed. 1991).
Criminal defense counsel are an exception to the proposition that legal actors have been
studiously unaware of or indifferent to developments in cognitive science. When resources
permit, they have leaned heavily upon psychologists in developing psyche-based defenses such
as the battered spouse syndrom. For a view of this relationship from the psychologist's side,
seEUSABETHF.LOFrUS&KATHEINEKETCHAMWrrNESSFORTEDEFNSE: THEAcCUSED,
THE EYEWITNESS, AND THE EXPERT WHO PUTS MEMORY ON TRIAL (1991).
Since the 1970s, legal scholars associated with the "Law and Society" movement have
been attentive to the relationship between law and the social sciences. In recent years, a small
cadre of scholars (only some of whom are associated with Law and Society) has focused
specifically on fostering a synergistic relationship between law and cognitive science. See, e.g.,
Jody Armour, Stereotypes andPrejudice: Helping LegalDecisionmakers Break the Prejudice
Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733 (1995) (arguing that colorblind formalism fails to reduce discrimi-
nation and therefore courts should encourage jurors actively to combat their automatic discrimi-
natory tendencies); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology ofDeterrence in TortLaw, 42 U. KAN.
L. REV. 115 (1993) (analyzing whether premises of tort law coincide with theories of psychol-
ogy in seeking deterrence); Andrew E. Lelling, Comment, Eliminative Materialism, Neurosci-
ence, and the CriminalLaw, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1471 (1993) (considering potentially devastat-
ing effect on legal system of denying accuracy of most fundamental psychological assumptions);
Laura Reider, Comment, Toward a New Testfor the Insanity Defense: Incorporating the Dis-
coveries of Neuroscience into Moral andLegal Theories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 289 (1998) (sum-
marizing theoretical and traditional frameworks for insanity defense and harmonizing them with
neuroscientifie evidence to create new model for insanity defense).
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is, of course, a force we should never discount, particularly in a system that
prides itself on maintaining stability. Additional explanations are worthy of
consideration.
To begin, perhaps we worry that it simply would cost too much to devel-
op a more sophisticated understanding of human nature. Secondly, perhaps
we also have doubts about how much better "better" can be. What benefits
would flow from greater self-understanding, and are they worth the candle?
A third possible explanation for our reluctance to ask hard questions about
ourselves is that we doubt the legal system's capacity to handle human com-
plexity. This is indeed a serious reservation, one to which I will return at this
essay's end. Finally, perhaps we shy away from cognitive complexity because
we fear that taking people as they truly are would undermine the law's capac-
ity to resolve disputes expeditiously. According to this view, sometimes less
is more or, at least, is faster.
Dispute resolution is not, however, the only end to which our system
aims. We often are unsatisfied with reaching just any old outcome; we want
to reach the right one. That is because we use the law as an instrument of
social policy and view adjudication as a mechanism for achieving policy
goals. That mechanism breaks down if we are indifferent to outcomes. If, for
example, we are incapable of determining whether a particular incentive
moves people to pollute less or to drive more carefully, we will be hard-
pressed to determine whether pertinent laws are working successfully.
Using law to regulate human behavior is not a recent invention. It has
been with us from the beginning. Criminal law, for example, represents not
just a means of punishing those who act in antisocial ways and of expressing
society's condemnation of particular behavior;6 it also constitutes an effort to
deter others from misbehaving. Similarly, tort law serves not only to compen-
sate specific victims and to allocate costs efficiently; it serves to guide the
behavior of the rest of us as well.
This brings me to my central point. To the extent that we use law to
regulate behavior or to shape tastes,7 it behooves us to understand as best we
can what makes people tick. An improved understanding of how we come to
grips with an unruly world is important for noninstrumental reasons as well.
In seeking to hold accountable those who transgress our social norms, we are
6. For an especially thoughtful exposition of the expressive function of criminal law, see
Dan M. Kahan, WhatDoAlternativeSancfionsMean?, 63 U. CHL L.REV. 591,594-605 (1996).
7. If the law can convince individuals to "choose" to act in pro-social ways, there exists
no need to regulate their behavior via institutional means. Although efforts to constrain the
recalcitrant often draw our attention, the law plays an equally important role in shaping people's
tastes to accord with societal norms. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATri-
TUDES, ANDTHELAW: PRIVATELAWPERSPECTIVES ONAPUBuC LAWPROBLEm(1985)(consid-
ering place of ideals, attitudes, and beliefs in our legal system).
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not indifferent to whether the transgressors could have done otherwise. In
fact, we ask a series of questions designed to determine whether or not the
transgressors are "responsible" for their actions and whether or not we can
fairly assign blame. Thus, our ability to use the law in a judgmental way is
tied inescapably to our ability to assess human will and human capacity.
Finally, in addition to using law to encourage people to act responsibly
and to hold accountable those who do not, we use law to determine what is
desirable in the first place. Legal process is one of the primary means by
which we Americans rethink old norms, fashion new ones, and mediate among
rival conceptions ofd"the good." In so doing, we constantly need to touch base
with what is humanly possible. Admittedly, social norms are in part aspira-
tional, an expression of our better angels. But if angels we be, we are neither
ascendant nor fallen. We exist somewhere between heaven and hell and
therefore must develop a moral compass for the middle sphere. After all, a set
of norms that is perfect for cherubim (or Vulcans or Klingons) well might
prove too challenging for us mere earthlings.
To be sure, we earthlings come in many sizes, shapes, and colors. We
travel in packs and stake out particular territories. We are the products of our
past and, in many ways, are the producers of our future. Does it make sense,
we might therefore ask, to focus on individual psyches when so much of the
space that we occupy is social? Surely the law is every bit as sociologically
impoverished as it is psychologically impoverished!
This question is a worthy critique of the individualistic approach I
advocate here. Indeed, I am sympathetic to those who contend that individual
reality largely is socially determined and that the very idea of "the individual"
is problematic. We truly are interconnected creatures, tied to and dependent
on others from the moment of conception.
Nevertheless, on any given day in any given place, we can find embodied
selves engaging in seemingly purposeful activity, guided by seemingly internal
commands. My central thesis is that our legal system needs to understand that
8. I borrow the phrase "sociologically impoverished" from Owen Fiss, who employed
it to explain why the bipolar model of adjudication is not up to the task of restructuring large-
scale institutions. Owen M. Fiss, Social and PoliticalFoundations ofAdjudication, 6 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1982). For decades, scholars associated with the Law and Society move-
ment and with various branches of critical legal thought (including critical legal studies,
feminist jurisprudence, critical race theory, and "LatCrit" theory) have railed against the socio-
logical vacuity of both traditional legal reasoning and "law and economics." However, critical
scholars hardly have cornered the market In recent years, a loosely-organized band of scholars,
gathered under the banner of "Socio-Economics," have sought "to advance an interdisciplinary
understanding of economic behavior. This understanding is open to the assumption that
individual choices are shaped not only by rational self-interest but also by emotions, social
bonds, beliefs, expectations, and perhaps most important, a sense of morality." Robert Ashford,
Socio-Economics: What Is ItsPlace in Law Practice?, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 611, 612.
SHAPING RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR
internal world, even as we struggle to understand more fully the ideologies,
structures, and social arrangements that help to shape it. While heeding the call
to social context, we must not lose sight of what we experience as ours alone.
In so saying, I do not mean to suggest that the individual is the only
proper unit of analysis or even a necessary starting point for anyone interested
in framing social policy or, more loftily, in transfonning society. Nor do I
mean to join the (growing?) ranks of those who treat deeply entrenched social
problems as if they were mere matters of personal choice and individual
responsibility. On the contrary, were we to take a good hard look at the
complex ways in which people in pain negotiate the concrete circumstances
of their lives, we well might call into question the view that ours is a society
in which free choice abounds. We might, then, redirect our attention to the
institutional arrangements that either foster or inhibit individual flourishing.9
And in the process, we just might discover that a mutually reinforcing, or a
mutually destructive, relationship forever links individual responsibility on the
one hand and collective responsibility on the other.
In this essay, I take the place of our imagined visitor from Saturn. In
particular, I reflect on how, if at all, our legal system takes account of the
complexities of human thought, feeling, and action. To make that task man-
ageable, I have opted to study a narrowly circumscribed area of law, namely
the mechanisms that we use to dissuade persons living with HIV, the virus
associated with AIDS, from engaging in behaviors that put others at risk of
infection. This subject area has many advantages, including that it involves
real people engaging in difficult cognitive and emotional work in the midst of
circumstances that are highly conflictual. As I hope to make plain, influenc-
ing the behavior of people whose lives have been fractured and whose atten-
tion is absorbed by issues of literal survival is no easy task, especially for a
legal system that prefers to view all of us as if we were the simple-minded
"man on the Clapham omnibus."'0
In Part H of this essay, I take a brief look at some of the ways that society
uses law to curb behavior that is thought to" pose a risk of HIV transmis-
9. For an especially thoughtful treatment of this theme, see Scott Buris, Gay Marriage
andPublic Health, 7 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 417 (1998).
10. The quoted phrase, the British equivalent ofthe "reasonable man," made its first appear-
ance in Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club, 1 K.B. 205, 224 (1933) (referring to "what any
reasonable member ofthe public" or "the man on the street" would intend as term of contract).
11. I use the equivocal phrase "is thought to" because some statutes make it a crime for
people living with HIV to engage in behaviors (nonpenetrative sex, for example) that pose little
if any risk of FHV transmission. Similarly, prosecutors sometimes pursue indictments in
response to behaviors (spitting, for example) that pose little risk. To be sure, this may involve
more than mere ignorance regarding matters of science and anatomy. Some legislators and
prosecutors may be responding to other forces, including a desire to isolate or to punish people
living with HIV (or a subset thereof); a felt need to mollify law enforcement officers (especially
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sion.'2 I then narrow my focus to the criminalization of unsafe behavior in
which persons living with HIV engage. The basic question I explore is the
following: Do such prosecutions make psychological sense? More specifi-
cally, what do they implicitly assume about human nature? What do they
assume about human motivation and about how we process information, form
beliefs, assess risks, order priorities, handle stress, and resolve conflict? Are
they well-calculated to deter untoward behavior? Is the message they express
a useful one from the standpoint of public health?
After teasing out the patchwork of assumptions underlying such prosecu-
tions, in Part Im I consider how well this view of human nature maps onto
reality. 3 To provide a context for that assessment, I explore the real life trials
and tribulations of Fabian Bridges, a well-chronicled young man who "know-
ingly' 4 put others at risk of HIV infection. In reflecting on Fabian's story, I
conclude that we are at sea in our efforts to curb risky sexual behavior. For
one thing, we never stop to ask what motivates people living with HIV to have
sex in the first place, and therefore we have no clue about how to alter their
incentive structures. Second, we rarely pause to consider whether our admo-
nitions are truly getting through to their intended targets, and if not, why not.
We think it sufficient that people living with IV have received information
about the risk that they pose to others and have heard that they must refrain
from sex unless they warn potential partners of their IIV status.
But the truth is that we human beings do not simply absorb information
like a sponge; we manage it, especially when it threatens our equilibrium or
puts us at risk of experiencing internal conflict. We filter, sort, evaluate,
manipulate, and sometimes embroider incoming news before assigning it to
appropriate folders in our brains - including the one marked "trash." We also
are quite capable of managing our beliefs, our emotions, our awareness, and
consciousness itself.' When faced with extremes, we do whatever it takes to
cope. We ignore, forget, compartmentalize, think wishfully, deny, repress,
in cases involving biting and spitting); a desire to cater to an electorate presumed (perhaps
inaccurately) to be vindictive toward persons living with HIV; and most fundamentally, the
decisionmakers' own psychological discomfort from being at risk from AIDS, from sexual
dishonesty, and from all that is unseen and unbidden.
12. See infra Part II (explaining attempts to regulate risky behavior through law).
13. See infra Part III (summarizing documentary of attempts to regulate behavior of
Fabian Bridges).
14. See infra note 17 (questioning definition of"know").
15. See generally, e.g., FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 5 (summarizing and evaluating
research on social cognition); DANIEL GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES, SIMPLE TRUTHS: THE PsYCHoL-
ouy OF SELF-DECEPTION (1985) (discussing "vital lies" that replace less comfortable truth,
creating mental blinds spots); STRESS AND COPING: AN ANrHOLOGY (Alan Monat & Richard
S. Lazarus eds., 3d ed. 1991) (providing introduction to current issues and controversies in
stress and coping field).
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and even self-deceive. That is what you and I do when pressed to the wall,
and the same is true for people living with HIV.
This vast gulf between the assumptions we make when attempting to
regulate risky behavior and the infinitely more complex mental world that
people under stress inhabit raises an important question: Can the law accom-
plish what it sets out to do? That is the central concern of Part IV of this
essay. 6 We have several choices. For example, we might enrich the law's
understanding of how humans function by permitting or even encouraging
expert testimony before legislative committees and in court proceedings con-
cerning such issues as how we humans manage information and how the
stresses associated with HIV-infection affect decision-making. Alternatively,
we might alter our expectations of what law can do. We might, for example,
cease trying to deter Peter by punishing Paul, or we might decide to exact
retribution whether or not a wrongdoer has acted voluntarily. A third option
would be to decide that adjudication is an ineffective and inappropriate means
of curbing sexual risk-taking. And, of course, there is always that old standby,
leaving well enough (or not so well enough) alone.
H. Regulating Risky Behavior
The notion that persons living with HIV know that they carry the virus
and understand fully the myriad consequences that flow therefrom underlies
most efforts to curb risky behavior. I want to challenge this premise 1 but not
without first acknowledging its reasonableness, especially with respect to
people who have tested positive for HIV antibodies. In most cases, upon
receiving their test results someone reminded them how lIV is and is not
transmitted and counseled them to play safe.
Every state has developed a network of sites where people can be tested
voluntarily for HEV-antibodies, and each has enacted laws that, to a greater or
lesser degree, assure the confidentiality of test results. 8 As a condition of
receiving federal funds for such sites, states must provide both pre-test and
post-test counseling.' 9 The former, in addition to focusing on whether testing
16. See infra Part IV (discussing options of technical fixes, streamlined expectations,
deregulation, status quo, and refining goals).
17. The easy jump from information to knowledge fails to take seriously the capacity of
human beings to miscode what we perceive, misremember what we encode, compartmentalize,
confabulate, deny, repress, and self-deceive. What does it mean to saythat I "know" something
if I successfully have repressed it or have reshaped it in my memory?
18. See CDC, Anonymous or Confidential -1V Counseling and Voluntary Testing in
Federally Funded Testing Sites - United States, 1995-1997, 48 MvIWR 509, 509 (1999)
(stating that all states provide confidential testing).
19. See CDC, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVs., HV COUNSELNG, T:ESTiNG
AND REFERRAL GUIDELI S 3-6 (May 1994) (summarizing program standards and guidelines).
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is appropriate given the client's risk profile, provides an opportunity for basic
AIDS education and risk-reduction planning. Post-test counseling provides
a further opportunity to encourage the uninfected to develop habits that reduce
their risk of contracting HIV. Of course, when the test result is positive, the
counselor's agenda shifts dramatically. She or he provides comfort to the
client, assesses the need for medical and psycho-social support, makes appro-
priate referrals, discusses whom the client should inform of his or her status,
and counsels the client on how to avoid transmitting the virus to others.2 °
In laying out the ground rules for testing and counseling, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the federal agency charged with stem-
ming the AIDS epidemic, acknowledges that the psychic din that a positive
test produces may drown out even the most skillful post-test counseling:
"Counselors should recognize that the emotional impact of learning about an
HIV positive test result often prevents clients from absorbing other informa-
tion during this encounter."" Unfortunately, rather than mandate follow-up
counseling, the CDC merely observes that it might be useful.'
Almost always, the news that one has tested positive for HIV turns the
recipient's world upside down, even if she or he has anticipated testing posi-
tive for some time. Facing the prospect of a drastically foreshortened life, a
painful death, diminished capacity, loss of control (over virtually everything
from one's own body to one's future), shattered dreams, ruptured relation-
ships, social stigma, and abandonment by those whose support an individual
needs most - facing the prospect of all this is not, to say the least, easy. And
so to be successful, counseling must take place over time and must be marked
by a willingness to range far beyond the basics of how individuals transmit
HIV and where to go for help. Indeed, even the basics may not sink in until
more pressing or frightening issues are addressed.
Some states deal with this reality by forming effective partnerships with
private, community-based AIDS organizations.' These organizations provide
ongoing counseling in a safe and culturally-appealing context. Moreover, in
such settings it is possible to provide peer support and to create optimal
20. See id. at 9-10 (discussing counseling guidelines regarding positive HIV test result).
21. Id. at 9.
22. The observation that "[c]ounseling of patients with positive results ... may require
more than one session" is a suggestive guideline rather than a mandatory standard. Id. The
corresponding standard merely states that the counselor or provider must "[a]ssess the client's
need for subsequent counseling or medical services." Id.
23. The CDC acknowledges the value of close collaboration with community-based AIDS
organizations, substance abuse treatment programs, and AIDS-friendly religious institutions but
does not mandate the development of such links. Id. at 4. Although recipients of federal funds
must develop "[a] written process for identifying, evaluating, and updating referral sources," the
Guidelines are vague as to the nature of such sources, apart from STD clinics and healthcare
providers. Id.
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conditions for the development of peer-based norms that value responsible
behavior.
What happens when counseling is ineffective (or non-existent) and people
infected with HIV continue to engage in risky behavior? Can the government
play an effective role?24 Some states have required certain healthcare and
social service providers to inform a client's sex partners ifthe provider knows
that the client has not told them that he or she is HIV positive.' And many
states have dusted off old or passed new quarantine laws which confer on
public health authorities the power to isolate people who persistently act in
ways that threaten the spread of infectious diseases. 6 Of course, unlike old-
fashioned infectious diseases such as tuberculosis, there is no known cure for
HIV, and people remain infectious for life. On the other hand, HV is no-
where near as easily or readily trnsmitted. Thus, the use of quarantine laws,
other than for the short-term purpose of isolating a person during a period of
extreme instability, is deeply problematic.
As the AIDS epidemic has progressed, the criminal law increasingly has
been used as a mechanism for deterring, punishing, and expressing outrage
over behavior thought to put others at risk of HIV transmission." A substan-
24. Of course, private actors who have contracted AIDS may seek compensation via the
torts system and arguably thereby deter risky behavior. See generally Donald H. J. Hermann
& Scott Burris, Torts: Private LawsuitsAbout H[Ji, in AIDS LAW TODAY: ANEW GUIDE FOR
THE PUBLIc 334 (Scott Burris et al. eds., 1993) (discussing successes and failures of tort
litigation in four areas of MIV-related tort cases). Although the government is involved
integrally in even the most mundane of private lawsuits, first by providing a public forum and
ultimately by enforcing judgments through the power of the state, I have chosen to focus on
those areas of law in which the government makes AIDS policy in a more explicit, public-
regarding way. That said, many of the arguments I make concerning deterrence in the criminal
law context would be similarly applicable in the torts context.
25. See generally Christine E. Stenger, Taking Tarasoff Where No One Has Gone Before:
Looking at "Duty to Warn" Under theA1DS Crisis, 15 ST. LOuiS U. PUB. L. REV. 471 (1996)
(examining expansive implications of California Supreme Court's articulation of "duty to warn,"
as various jurisdictions apply it to physician liability, and as it relates to today's AIDS crisis).
26. See Larry Gostin, ThePoliticsofAlDS: CompulsoryStatePowers, Public Health, and
Civil Liberties, 49 Oaio ST. L.. 1017, 1028-29 (1989) (summarizing disease- and behavior-
based isolation statutes that several states enacted in late 1980s).
27. See generally Larry Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies, in AIDS LAW
TODAY, supra note 24, at 72-77 (discussing various types of personal control measures available
to health authorities to prevent transmission of AIDS).
28. See generally Harlon L. Dalton, Criminal Law, in AIDS LAW TODAY, supra note 24,
at 242 (discussing HIV and criminalization of risky behavior); see also generally IV/AIDS and
the States: A Look at Laws Enacted in 1998, 14 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) 8 (Jan. 22, 1999)
(reviewing major developments in IY policies in states); CriminalExposure to HIW: Evolving
Laws and Court Cases, 13 AIDS Pol'y & L. (BNA) Bonus Report (July 24, 1998) (examining
legislative responses to AIDS and implications in courts); LAMBDA LEGAL FOUND. FUND, INC.,
STATE CRIMINAL STATUTEs ON HIV TRANSMISSION (August, 1998) [hereinafter LAMBDA
SURVEY] (providing table of cites and summaries of state statutes).
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tial percentage of nonmilitary prosecutions29 involve courtroom, jailhouse, or
arrest-scene skirmishes in which a detainee or inmate reportedly spits at or
bites a law enforcement officer.30 Often, the detainee punctuates the hostili-
ties by announcing that he or she is infected with HIV.3' In some cases, the
detainee reportedly expresses the desire to transmit the virus to the officer.32
Not surprisingly, the officers in these cases react with alarm, anger, and fear,
especially if they lack proper information about the means of HIV transmis-
sion. Seeking retribution, they turn to a criminal justice system that, at least
on the margin, they can expect to respond sympathetically to those who serve
it day-in and day-out.
The criminal charges lodged in biting and spitting cases have a familiar
ring to them: assault, aggravated assault, assault with a deadly weapon, at-
tempted manslaughter, and attempted murder.33 Most of these charges are
quite heavy-duty, even when one factors in the use of over-charging to offset
likely plea bargaining. This heavy hand reflects, in my opinion, the reality
that some prosecutors are highly phobic when it comes to AIDS, that some
prosecutors are overly attentive to the publicity value of high-profile AIDS
cases, and that the victims typically are adept at making the system work for
them.
These traditibnal categories of crime are a poor fit. It is exceedingly
difficult to satisfy the elements necessary for conviction. Given the nearly
negligible probability of transmitting HIV via biting or spitting, it is difficult
to identify harm that amounts to an aggravated assault, much less anything
29. See infra note 34 (explaining that situation in the military is quite different).
30. Seegeneral yGEORGETOWN/JOHNSHOPKINSUNIV.PROGRAMONL.&PUB.HEALTH,
THE AIDS LiTIGATION PROJECT: A LOOK AT HIV/AIDS IN TBE COURTS OF THE 1990s, pt. 1,
§ IV (3d ed., July 24, 1996) (visited July 13, 1999) http'/ihivinsite.ucsf.edu/social/kaiser_
family found/2098.2a96.html) (summarizing cases dealing with state restrictions on persons).
31. See, e.g., Weeks v. Scott, 55 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that Weeks
revealed his HIV-positive status shortly before spitting in guard's face); United States v.
Sturgis, 48 F.3d 784, 786 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that when corpsman asked Sturgis to stop
biting and spitting because he was HIV positive, Sturgis explained that he was trying to infect
medical personnel); State v. Smith, 621 A-2d 493,497 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (stating
that Smith threatened to bite officer and to give him AIDS).
32. See, e.g., Weeks, 55 F.3d at 1059 (affirming district court's denial of petition for writ
of.habeas corpus). An HIV positive inmate became agitated while guards transported him from
one prison unit to another. Id. at 1061. In response to being "placed... on the ground and
further restrained," he "yell[ed] and curse[d] at the officers" and, according to their testimony,
threatened them, saying that he was "going to take somebody with him when he went" Id.
Thereupon he spit twice in the face of one of the guards. Id. He was convicted of attempted
murder and, because of Texas's "three strikes" law, received a life sentence. Id. The court of
appeals affirmed the conviction. Id.
33. See THE AIDS LiTIGATIONPROJECT, supra note 30, pt 1, § IV (noting that generally
prosecutors invoke charges of assault and attempted murder).
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more serious. To be sure, the injury inflicted is real, but it is primarily psy-
chic. Indeed, in the biting and spitting cases that is often the perpetrator's
goal: to instill fear and to express loathing. Conduct amounting to the inten-
tional infliction of psychic pain well may be punishable under the criminal
law as disorderly conduct, menacing, and the like. For the most part, how-
ever, offenses against the psyche occupy the lower rungs of the penal ladder.
It is also difficult in the biting and spitting cases to prove the requisite
mental element. In such cases, ample evidence often exists that the defendant
harbored ill will toward the victim. However, that is a far cry from a murder-
ous intent or even a desire to inflict severe bodily harm. And what are we to
make of the fact that the perpetrators presumably are aware, as a result ofthe
counseling that accompanies HIV-antibody testing, that HIV is not transmissi-
ble via saliva and is exceedingly difficult to transmit by biting? How do we
square this with the fact that many of them reportedly express the desire to
infect their victims?
One possibility is that the perpetrators know full well that transmission
is impossible or highly unlikely but are banking on the fact that their targets
are likely to be less well-informed. Scary words, much more than spittle or
teeth, are the real weapon. Another possibility is that despite all their counsel-
ing, the detainees do believe that they can transmit the virus in this way.
(This, by the way, raises the specter that people living with HIV also could
disbelieve counselors' warnings that unprotected sex and shared needles can
transmit HIV.) There is also a fuzzy middle ground: perhaps the typical
perpetrator neither believes nor disbelieves that transmission is possible but
exhibits a third mental state in which the question of belief becomes detached
from and irrelevant to the task at hand (to wit, appearing as menacing as possi-
ble).
If nothing else, this extended rumination on the mental state of the
accused in a typical biting and spitting case suggests that the criminal law's
conceptual apparatus - abstractions such as "intent," "belief," and "knowl-
edge" - is much too crude to capture actual human thought and feeling. It also
suggests that prosecutions of this sort may be ill-advised for pragmatic rea-
sons. It is, of course, not a good idea to permit detainees to intimidate law
enforcement officers at will. However, reacting to biting and spitting in an
apoplectic manner (for example, by characterizing it as attempted murder)
simply feeds the officers' fear and has the perverse effect of handing detainees
a huge weapon in the ongoing struggle between the keepers and the kept.
When prosecutors respond to biting and spitting as if it were truly dangerous,
rather than insulting, degrading, and sometimes painful, every inmate with
salivary glands and a set of incisors thereby receives the equivalent of a nine-
millimeter Glock that is ever at the ready.
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Although the biting and spitting cases may be more numerous, at least
in civilian life, it is the cases involving sex that grab the emotions of the
public at large.34 They tap into an incredibly deep and murky reservoir of
worry, fear, excitement, and dread. Quite apart from AIDS, sex, and espe-
cially but not exclusively casual sex, embodies for many of us an unsettling
mix of reward and risk, pleasure and danger." The thought that unbeknownst
to us a lover might carry HIV serves to remind us of how vulnerable we truly
are, emotionally as well as physically, when it comes to sex. The fact that we
cannot tell whether a lover has HIV is scary both in its own right and in that
it reminds us that so much else of importance is also beyond our immediate
powers of observation. We wonder: Will Mr. Right prove sensitive to our
needs? Will Ms. Right find us wanting? Has she been completely forthcom-
ing about her sexual past? Has he told the truth about where he was last
night?
Given our profound unease surrounding sex, together with its near uni-
versality as a human pastime (or at least aspiration), it is not surprising that we
would look for ways to compel others to behave responsibly. We want to feel
safe, to be made safe, to be protected from bad choices, and to avoid having
to reckon fully with the risks of carnal knowledge.
Early on, prosecutors pursued the "sex without disclosure" prosecutions
under the same traditional criminal statutes as the biting and spitting cases,
and their cases suffered many of the same infirmities. To be sure, the harm
element is satisfied more easily, given the very real possibility of sexual
transmission of HIV. However, in cases where the victim turns out to be HIV-
positive, proof of causation is often difficult and messy. And where the victim
is HIV-negative, it is difficult to justify more serious charges such as aggra-
vated assault and attempted murder.
As for the mental element, knowledge and intent are, if anything, more
murky in the sex cases than in the biting and spitting prosecutions. Although
34. A large percentage of all prosecutions and about fifty percent of convictions involve
armed services personnel who face prosecution in military courts under military law for putting
sex partners at risk. See Vivienne Walt, AiDS-Exposure Laws Debated, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Sept.
23, 1991, at 27 (stating that about half convictions were for violating military orders to inform
their sex partners that they have AIDS virus); THE AIDS LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 30,
pt. 1, § IV (stating that military courts have convicted defendants in substantial number of cases
involving criminal conviction for engaging in unprotected sex without informing partners).
This initially surprising statistic makes sense when one takes into account the military's height-
ened capacity to monitor people's personal lives, its unique ability to "encourage" reluctant
witnesses to come forward, and the availability of such lesser included offenses as "willful
disobedience of an order by a superior officer" to use condoms and to warn sex partners.
35. I borrow this latter opposition from Carole Vance, who employed it as the conceptual
umbrella for an extraordinary collection of essays, PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING
FEMALE SEXUArrY (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984).
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exceptions doubtlessly exist, it is probably a gross distortion to suggest that
people with HIV who fail to reveal their status to sex partners usually do so
out of a desire to cause harm. More typically, their probable goal is to avert
isolation, to savor intimacy, to affirm rather than extinguish life, and to confirm
that they remain sexually desirable. And where commercial sex is involved,
the failure to warn reflects the simple desire or need to make money. It is
especially ludicrous to charge defendants with attempted murder. Given the
improbability of HIV transmission even under "ideal" circumstances such as
anal sex without a condom and given the ability of new antiviral drugs to
increase longevity even to the point that AIDS may soon constitute a chronic
rather than fatal disease, it is hard to imagine that sexual intercourse would be
anyone's lethal weapon of choice.
These days, prosecutors increasingly bring cases under HIV-specific
statutes. Sixty percent of the state legislatures have passed laws making it a
crime for people who know they carry the HLV virus to have sex without
warning their partners.36 Some statutes are worded so broadly that they would
seem to bar all sexual activity, no matter how unlikely to result in transmis-
sion.37 In general, however, such statutes avoid many ofthe pitfalls associated
with the application of traditional crime categories in that prosecutors need
not establish harm, causation, and intent."8
The issue remains whether the bare fact that someone has informed the
defendant of his or her EIV status implies knowledge. To begin with, what
the defendant heard may be different than what the counselor or healthcare
provider meant to convey. The fact that he or she acknowledges what the
counselor said or even parrots it back is not dispositive. As anyone in a long
term relationship knows, the phrase "yes, dear" does not mean necessarily that
real communication has taken place.
Sometimes the intended audience may not understand the counselor's
words. For example, the warning not to engage in "genital-anal sex" may
mean little to someone who regularly employs a markedly different vocab-
ulary for such activity. Equally problematic are words that are inherently
36. See IN-V/AIDS and the States, supra note 28, at 8, 10 (stating that New York and
Alabama passed partner notification laws in 1998). The pertinent sex acts vary from statute to
statute. Some statutes, in addition to criminalizing "unwamed" sex, make it a crime for persons
who know they are infected to share injection needles or to donate blood or organs for trans-
plant See generally LAMBDA SURVEY, supra note 28 (setting out table detailing each statute).
I am aware, however, of no cases on point
37. New Jersey, for example, makes it a crime for someone with HIV to engage in "sexual
penetration" without the informed consent of the other person. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:34-5(b)
(1999). The definition of "sexual penetration" includes "insertion of the hand, finger or object
into the anus or vagina." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1(c) (1995).
38. Most H1V-specific criminal statutes dispense with these elements of causation and
intent CriminalExposure to HIV, supra note 28, Bonus Report 1.
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ambiguous. For example, what does "don't exchange bodily fluids" mean?
You should not swap a cup of sweat for a pint of mucus? Which fluids,
exactly, pose a danger of transmission? And in what sense does oral, or
vaginal, or anal sex involve an exchange of fluids? Then there is the pesky
business of sex itself. Simply warning someone to not have it may not be
precise enough. As we all know by now, thanks to recent goings on in Wash-
ington, sex has no fixed definition.
Even if a one hundred percent correspondence exists between what a
counselor or provider says and what she means and between what a client
hears and what he understands, that does not end the matter. After all, just
because we know a fact at one time does not mean that we know it in the same
way at a later time. Anyone who has ever received a disturbing medical
diagnosis or has sought legal advice while overwrought knows how hard it is
to remember the next day what exactly the doctor or lawyer said. And even
if our short term recall is good, it is quite common for memories to change
over time.
In part, memories change because we do not store the memory of a
particular event in a single place in our brain. 9 Take the drafting of this
essay, for example. Here I sit in my study at home, teetering piles of paper
surrounding me, the computer screen and a slender halogen lamp lighting my
work space. If, say, a month from now I were prompted to recall this moment,
I would have to retrieve the visuals from one part of my brain, the sounds
(none of which - a lazily barking dog, someone hammering outside, the quiet
hum of my computer - I noticed until I began to tap out this sentence) from
another, the shape of my words from yet another, and their meaning from
some fourth location. If I wanted to recall my current mood (buoyant because
I stepped out of the shower not long ago, agitated because the remodeling of
my kitchen is dragging on, and embarrassed and chastened because this essay
is way overdue to my law review editor), I would have to peruse yet a differ-
ent sector of my brain. Thus, to recapture this precise moment I would have
to retrieve its component parts from several locations and would have to
reassemble them. To make matters even more complicated, I may have
encoded the same stimulus in multiple ways. For example, I may have as-
signed the content of a given sentence to the tangle of neurons labeled "things
I know about AIDS" as well as to the tangles labeled 'Things I know about
cognitive science" and "ideas for the Washington and Lee essay."
39. See generallyRICHARDM. RESTAK, THE MODULARBRAIN: HowNEWDISCOVERIES
IN NEURoscrENcE ARE ANswERNG AGE-OLD QuEsTIONs ABOUT MEMORY, FREE WILL,
CoNscIousNEss, AND PERSONAL IDENTrY (1994) (describing recent discoveries of brain
organization and their implications); Daniel Goldman, Miscodingls Seen as the Root of False
Memories, N.Y. TImEs, May 31, 1994, at C1 ("The brain stores the memory of each sense in a
different part of the cortex.").
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As I set about retrieving and reassembling the various pieces of my
drafting experience, ample room for error exists. Moreover, during the
intervening period between storage and retrieval, alterations to the various
component parts are common. I well might unconsciously "fill-in" gaps in the
story. I might forget or fhil to encode parts that are not particularly salient or
germane, such as the barking dog. Because of cognitive dissonance, I might
harmonize or drop altogether those elements that seem to be in conflict, such
as my buoyant mood and my agitation. Because I am not a cipher and have
often reflected on human nature prior to writing this essay, I might in recalling
this moment mix together bits and pieces from different sources. Finally, the
circumstances which prompt me to recall it might influence my recollection
of drafting this page. For example, the picture I reassemble for a seminar on
essay writing might differ dramatically from the one I reassemble for a confer-
ence on cognitive science and law.40
All of what I just have said applies to garden-variety recall. Then there
is the special case of information that threatens to disrupt a person's equilib-
rium or to cause her great stress. We have all had the experience of forgetting
something that was too painful to remember. Many of us have engaged in
compartmentalizing, which is a fancy term for putting up walls in our minds,
and have paid attention to troublesome facts only when it was safe to do so.
I, for one, also have engaged in denial concerning things about myself that are
embarrassing or unpleasant. And just maybe I have repressed a thing or two
as well, although by definition I cannot describe for you anything that remains
buried.
It is not unusual for persons living with HIV to engage in each of these
coping strategies. Rather than suffer constant reminders of the increased
probability of early death, some folk become adroit at mental gatekeeping and
admit their HIV status into consciousness only as necessary. Others compart-
mentalize, deny, or repress so as to avoid having to face up to the foolhardy
behavior that put them in harm's way. Still others hide their status from
themselves because they are unable to deal with the stigma that AIDS carries.
And some solve all these problems by engaging in wishful thinking. "Maybe
I have beaten the odds," they think, "and am no longer infectious."
lII. Fabian's Story
What do we make of such complex mental states? They certainly do not
resemble very closely the simple-minded conception of mens rea that under-
girds the criminal law. Nor do they inspire confidence that we can figure
out how to deter irresponsible behavior and can determine with reasonable
40. See generally Fm & TAYLOR, supra note 5, ch. 7-10 (discussing processes of social
cognition and their effects).
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accuracy who is blameworthy. It is far from clear that people caught up in
the swirl surrounding AIDS are able even to hear the criminal law's com-
mands.
We know relatively little about most of the people who find themselves
on the wrong side of the "v" in prosecutions for engaging in "sex without
warning." Most cases, presumably, are pleaded out. Those that go to trial and
result in an acquittal are unlikely to generate much of a paper or digital trail,
apart from files stored in a courthouse basement. For that matter, convictions
are unlikely to produce a written, opinion, except on appeal. Even then, what
we learn about the defendant is usually little more than a series of adjectives,
some bordering on epithets. AIDS-oriented newsletters and looseleaf services
often chronicle the beginnings and endings of cases (usually by relying on
reports in local print media), but their descriptions tend to be sketchy.
Occasionally, however, an AIDS case achieves great notoriety. Usually
this happens when a tort plaintiff is especially sympathetic, a tort defendant
is well known, or a criminal defendant had a large number of partners. Even
then, we do not necessarily get to see the case from the defendant's perspec-
tive. Usually, journalists and judges alike impute motives to defendants or
infer an entire mindset from a single comment or action.
An exception to all of the above is the story of Fabian Bridges, an HIv-
positive gay black man whose sexual irresponsibility a nationally-televised
PBS documentary broadcasted first in 1986.4" While filming a contemporane-
ous account of Bridges's struggle with HIV, the film crew learned that he
occasionally engaged in sex with others, notwithstanding his HV status.
41. See generallyAlDS: A Story (PBS television broadcast, Mar. 25,1986) (documenting
life story of Fabian Bridges).
A more recent exception is Nushawn Williams, an HIV-positive drifter who "admitted to
having unprotected sexual intercourse with more than 50 women and teen-age girls in...
western New York, infecting 13 of them." CriminalExposure to M1, supra note 28, at Bonus
Report 1. He, together with Damell "Boss Man" McGee, who reportedly had sex with more
than 100 women and girls in the St. Louis area, infecting 30 or more of them, "put a new face
on AIDS" in 1988 and "became the impetus for new legislation on criminal exposure to Iv."
Id. The Williams case, in particular, generated considerable publicity, perhaps because in
addition to everything else he was an African-American male in small town America and most
of his sex partners were younger, white females. Although most of the media coverage was both
lurid and vapid, JoAnn Wypijewski's cover story in Harper 'sMagazine is stunning in its subtlety
and sophistication. JoAnn Wypijewski, The SecretSharer: Sex, Race, andDenial in an Ameri-
can Small Town, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, July 1998, at 35 (recounting Williams's impact on
Jamestown, New York). Because of its richness of detail and Wypijewski's remarkable ability
to get inside the heads of her informants, I have been sorely tempted to mine the article in order
to present here a picture of Williams in all his complexity. Ultimately, however, I have decided
to feature someone - Fabian Bridges - who is much more typical of HIV-positive folk who act
in sexually irresponsible ways. I worry that if I were to focus on an outlier like Nushawn
Williams, I would replicate the mistake made by those state legislatures that enacted draconian
laws in response to the uproar surrounding him.
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They then decided to make that fact - and the bumbling and ineffectual efforts
of several public agencies to intervene - a central theme of the documentary.
Thus, millions of Americans watched transfixed as Bridges promised his
doctor on camera that he would not put others at risk and then later admitted
that he subsequently had picked up and had sex with several men in exchange
for money.
At first glance, Bridges appeared to be, as one print journalist described
him, "a miserable, wretched, uncaring victim-turned-victimizer who used his
body as a lethal weapon."42 But upon reflection, it is apparent that the primary
reason Bridges prostituted himself was because he had no other source of
money. Apparently, the documentary makers missed this simple reality. They
knew full-well that Bridges was penniless, and in a voice-over they revealed
that on occasion they gave him the munificent sum of fifteen dollars so that
he could rent a room in a "flophouse" (their word choice) for the night.43 The
voice-over explains, sanctimoniously, that they gave Bridges only small
amounts of money because they did not want to be implicated in supporting
someone who was behaving in such an irresponsible fashion." Of course,
they did not mind exploiting Bridges by filming him "on the stroll" as he
picked up tricks.
During the period of time covered by the documentary, Bridges bounced
back and forth between three different cities as public health officers, govern-
ment officials, police, and prosecutors tried to figure out how to curb his
behavior. One sheriff gave Bridges a one-way plane ticket and instructed him,
in effect, to "get out of Dodge by sunset." Viewers also watched a series of
painful interactions between Bridges and his family. We saw him lose his
main source of moral support, as his sister's husband forced her to choose
between himself and Fabian. "I wouldn't care if it was just me," said the
brother-in-law lamely, "but I've got our baby to think of.145 We also watched
in agony as Bridges desperately tried to get his mother to come see him or to
let him come see her. After several plaintive phone calls, his mother finally
appeared. And although she looked for all the world like one ofthose indomi-
table plus-sized black women that the likes of Hattie McDaniel and Esther
Rolle made famous on screen, it quickly became apparent that her only real
interest in Fabian was financial.
Far from showing us "a miserable, wretched, uncaring victim-turned-
victimizer," the documentary captured something else: a man who was lonely,
42. Howard Rosenberg, "Frontline"AlDS Commentary: Documentary Makers'Relent-
less Focus on the Lethal Lifestyle ofa DyingFabian BridgesPuts Minneapolis Station andPBS
in the Spotlight, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1986, § 6, at 1.
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adrift, broke, and broken. His voice betrayed resignation and despair, not anger
or revenge. Bridges was perhaps most revealing when he described a sexual
encounter that was not commercial: 'We talked mostly. I liked him. What I
liked most was how tender he was. After we cleaned each other up and stuff,
he just held me in his arms. I like it when they hold me."46 For Bridges, as for
many people, sex served as a proxy for intimacy and as a temporary escape
from life's miseries. Although he may have put his partners at risk (no one
bothered to inquire whether he used a condom or otherwise engaged in safer
sex), he did not act out of malice or evil intent. The documentary's ending
bears out this interpretation of Fabian's story. Disturbed by what he had been
reading in the local newspapers, a leader of Houston's gay community tracked
Bridges down and offered him the one thing no one else thought to provide: a
place to stay, financial support, and a network of people who cared. Sheltered
and protected in this way, Bridges no longer felt tempted to put others at risk.
Bridge's story calls into question many ofthe assumptions legislators and
courts make in criminalizing risky sex. For example, lawmakers assume first
that people who have sex without informing their partners of their positive
HIV status act out of callousness, indifference, or malice. Secondly, lawmak-
ers assume that when engaging in sex, individuals are capable of functioning
as rational profit-maximizers. Thirdly, lawmakers assume that as HIV-posi-
tive individuals leap into bed they are actually conscious ofthe risk they might
pose to others and of the criminal law's brooding omnipresence. Fourthly,
lawmakers assume that the pain of the criminal sanction far outweighs the
benefits of the imminent sexual encounter, even when discounted by the
probability of its imposition. Finally, they assume that therefore HIV-positive
individuals rationally will choose to obey the law. Without belaboring the
point, each of these assumptions is dubious at best.
IV Implications for "Doing" Law
Given all this, can law be effective in regulating risky sexual behavior?
I trust that I already have said enough to convince you that the answer to this
question is far from an untroubled "yes." Indeed, I suspect that "probably not"
is closer to the truth. But this is not necessarily cause for despair. Perhaps we
can retool our legal system so as to make it more effective in fostering sexual
responsibility. Or perhaps the shortcomings of our legal system are a signal
that we ask too much from it or ask the wrong things of it and that we would
be better served by directing our energies elsewhere. A third option exists as
well. Without retreating from our goal, perhaps we should rethink where best




By far the rosiest conclusion47 is that with a little tweaking here and a little
boosting there, our legal system can accommodate cognitive complexity in
much the same way as it responds to any other kind of scientific challenge.
Thus, for example, we might require that legislative committees include
staffers well-versed in the cognitive sciences. Similarly, we might insist that
proposals to regulate human behavior routinely be vetted in public hearings at
which witnesses expert in social psychology, cognitive psychology, social
anthropology, and the like testify. Judicial fixes are even easier to imagine. As
part of their orientation to the bench, judges could receive sensitivity training
on the importance of moving beyond stick-figure justice. Courts could refash-
ion or reinterpret rules of evidence so as to allow counsel, where relevant, to
explore the vagaries of perception, memory, and recall and to identify the com-
plex ways in which we human beings manage distressing information."
I have no special insight into whether such technical fixes are likely to
make much difference. I do note, however, that our record of adapting to
other scientific challenges is spotty at best. And it is especially difficult to
change our ways when we have relied on mother wit for centuries.
B. Streamlined Expectations
If, despite our best efforts, we are unable to rework our legal system to
take account of human complexity, one intellectually honest response is to
alter our expectations of what law can do. In particular, we might identify
those legal determinations that are especially cognition-sensitive and frankly
acknowledge that they are beyond the law's scope. For example, we might
decide that general deterrence is more than we can hope for, given the uncer-
47. In labeling this approach "rosy," I do not mean to suggest that it is therefore wrong-
headed or soft-nosed. After all, I have been accused publicly, perhaps correctly, of being a
"daffy optimis[t]." J. Anthony Lukas, Race Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 1, 1995, §7 (Book
Review), at 10.
48. Professor Jody Armour has proposed a similar approach in the context of racial stereo-
typing. See generally Armour, supra note 5 (arguing that colorblind formalism fails to reduce
discrimination and therefore courts should encourage jurors actively to combat their automatic
discriminatory tendencies). Drawing on empirical research by leading social psychologists, he
observes that stereotypes are the result of "well-learned internal associations about social groups
that are governed by automatic cognitive processes." Id. at 733. Even genuinely nonprejudiced
people act in discriminatory ways when something triggers deeply ingrained stereotypes.
Armour argues, therefore, that courts should allow counsel for socially marginalized clients
explicitly to raise the issue of unconscious stereotyping in cases of alleged discrimination. Id.
at 733-34, 759-61. Far from "play[ing] to the prejudices of the jury," id. at 733, once the
subterranean world of stereotypes is made visible, nonprejudiced jurors are able to avoid reflex-
ively responding to them and instead can follow their conscious commitments to racial justice.
Id. at 734,759-61. I find Armour's argument persuasive, but I note that the cognitive processes
he describes are far simpler than those in which people struggling to live with HIV engage.
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tain connection between punishing Peter and influencing Paul. Or we might
decide to disconnect retribution from blameworthiness, reasoning that we lack
the competence both to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary (if that
is indeed where the line should be drawn) and to appraise mental states.
Alternatively, we might conclude that absent the ability to assess blame-
worthiness with confidence, we should abandon retribution as a justification
for imposing criminal sanctions. Of course, if our heightened sense of limita-
tion leads us to abandon both general deterrence and the retributive ideal, the
criminal law would be left with the slenderest of moral foundations.
49
C. Deregulation
Any queasiness we feel about proceeding under either of these circum-
stances - punishing without confidence that we are morally justified or pun-
ishing without regard for moral justification - would be allayed substantially
if it turns out that we can foster responsible behavior without resort to the
criminal justice system except in extreme cases. If private institutions or
noncoercive governmental institutions successfully can navigate the cognitive
world of people in pain, perhaps we should give deregulation a try.
Of course, we lawyers have a difficult time seeing beyond legal institu-
tions on the one hand and the mythic or mythical market on the other. But the
truth is that most conformity to social expectations has little to do with either.
If we recall the story of Fabian Bridges, it was neither the dictates of the law
nor the invisible hand of the market that led him to set his life aright, but
rather the quite visible hand of a community of people who identified with and
cared for him.
That said, it is (as usual) unwise to draw too sharp a distinction between
public commands and private ordering. One of government's functions is to
create the conditions in which private institutions can flourish. Recall that in
the AIDS arena, government-sponsored IlV testing and counseling serves, at
its best (although not in Fabian's case), to funnel HIV-positive people into
supportive environments that allow for the development of peer-based norms
of safe behavior.
D. Standing Pat
If it tuned out that none of the strategies discussed above moves us any
closer to achieving the ideal of responsible sexual behavior, we would have
49. Although we could continue to impose sanctions solely as a means of expressing our
collective distaste for and condemnation of particular behavior, we thereby would open our-
selves to moral vacuity and majority oppression of the merely different See generally Harlon
L. Dalton, Book Review, "Disgust" and Punishment, 96 YALE L.J. 881 (1987) (considering
whether government can prohibit conduct that is offensive but not harmful).
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to consider the otherwise unpalatable option of leaving things as they are.
Indeed, even if other options are partially successful, we should consider
whether some side effects make the cure worse than the disease. For example,
if we opt to make adjudication more "scientific," we run the risk of removing
decision-making from citizen jurors. In criminal cases and in some civil
cases, that shift is of constitutional import. And unlike some clauses of that
great document, the Sixth and Seventh Amendments are direct expressions of
our commitment to government of the people, by the people, and for the
people." Indeed, lawsuits in general and actions tried to ajury in particular,
constitute our Nation's most intimate form of governance. Therefore, we
should be careful in adopting reforms that trench on citizen-centered govern-
ment.
Similarly, reforms that frankly acknowledge the limits of our capacity to
deal with cognitive complexity run the risk of undermining our faith in the
legislative and judicial enterprises. That is a good thing, up to a point. It is
one thing to spotlight our shortcomings and to push for a radical reimaging of
the law's human subject. But it is quite another to foster cynicism and to
counsel despair. Perhaps at the end of the day, justice that is rough but
comfortable to the pursuers and the pursued alike will have to do.
E. Rethinking Our Goals
Finally, all of these ruminations may lead us back to an option that I
foreshadowed early on in the essay. If despite our best efforts we keep falling
short in our attempts to promote responsible sexual behavior, the take-home
lesson may be that we are training our sights on the wrong target or on a target
that is too small. Instead of focusing solely on individual conduct, we would
do well to pay attention to the environment that conditions the "choices" that
individuals make.
Is there so much static in the air that others cannot hear our messages, no
matter how carefully we craft them? Are there any institutional barriers -
such as the possible loss of health insurance upon discovery of one's HIV
status or the risk that one's sexuality, drug history, or HIV status will become
an issue in a child custody battle - that militate against telling all to potential
sex partners? Do current laws - such as those prohibiting the distribution of
condoms in schools, limiting the content of sex education, prohibiting the sale
of injection needles without a prescription, or denying funding to organiza-
tions that treat homosexuality as an acceptable lifestyle - undermine or im-
pede efforts to play safe? Do structural features - such as an economic system
that virtually assures that some people will live on the margin - promote
instability, thereby making wise choices more difficult? Do aspects of our
50. U.S. CONST. amends. VI & VIL
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culture - such as elevating sexiness to a position above both cleanliness and
godliness - create a powerful counterforce to responsible behavior?
Individual decisions are never made in a vacuum. If we do not pay atten-
tion to the environmental factors that impede, distract, or dissuade individuals
from behaving responsibly and do not take steps to transform or at least to
neutralize them, we then well may discover that even the most cognitively
sophisticated legal system will leave us wanting.
